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Abstract. The paper introduces an extension of the proposal according to which
conceptual representations in cognitive agents should be intended as heteroge-
neous proxytypes. The main contribution of this paper is in that it details how
to reconcile, under a heterogeneous representational perspective, different theo-
ries of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning. In particular, it
provides a novel theoretical hypothesis - as well as a novel categorization algo-
rithm called DELTA - showing how to integrate the representational and reason-
ing assumptions of the theory-theory of concepts with the those ascribed to the
prototype and exemplars-based theories.
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1 Introduction
The proposal of characterizing the representational system of cognitive artificial agents
by considering conceptual representations as heterogeneous proxytypes was introduced
in [17]1 and has been recently employed and successfully tested in systems like DUAL-
PECCS [21, 20, 22], later integrated with diverse cognitive architectures such as ACT-
R [1], CLARION [32], SOAR [15] and Vector-LIDA [31]. The main contribution of
this work is in that it offers a proposal to reconcile, under a heterogeneous represen-
tational perspective, not only prototype and exemplars based representations and rea-
soning procedures, but also the representational and reasoning assumptions ascribed to
the so called theory-theory of concepts [27]. In doing so, the paper proposes a novel
categorization algorithm, called DELTA (i.e. unifieD CatEgorization aLgorithm for
heTerogeneous representAtions) able to unify and integrate, in a cognitively oriented
1 The expression heterogeneous proxytypes refers to both a theoretical and computational hy-
pothesis combining the proxytype theory of concepts with the so called heterogeneity ap-
proach to concept representation. The Section 3 of this paper contains a brief discussion of the
proposal.
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perspective, all the common-sense categorization mechanisms available in the cognitive
science literature. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the Section 2 provides
an overview of the main representational paradigms proposed by the Cognitive Science
and the Cognitive Modelling communities. Section 3, briefly synthesize the represen-
tational framework intending concepts as heterogeneous proxytypes by showing how
such theoretical proposal has been actually implemented and successfully tested in the
DUAL-PECCS system. Section 4, proposes a more close analysis of the findings of the
theory-theory of concepts, while, Section 5, proposes a novel and extended categoriza-
tion algorithm integrating the theory-theory representational and reasoning mechanisms
with those involving both exemplars and prototypes.
2 Prototypes, Exemplars, Theories and Proxytypes
In the Cognitive Science literature, different theories about the nature of concepts have
been proposed. According to the so called classical theory, concepts can be simply
defined in terms of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Such theory was domi-
nant until the mid ’70s of the last Century, when Rosch’s experimental results demon-
strated the inadequacy of such a theory for ordinary –or common-sense – concepts
[29]. Rosch’s results suggested, on the other hand, that ordinary concepts are charac-
terized and organized in our mind in terms of prototypes. Since then, different theories
of concepts have been proposed to explain different representational and reasoning as-
pects concerning the problem of typicality: the prototype theory, the exemplars theory
and the theory-theory. According to the prototype view, knowledge about categories is
stored in terms of prototypes, i.e., in terms of some representation of the “best” instance
of the category. In this view, the concept bird should coincide with a representation of a
typical bird (e.g., a robin). In the simpler versions of this approach, prototypes are repre-
sented as (possibly weighted) lists of typical features. According to the exemplar view,
a given category is mentally represented as set of specific exemplars explicitly stored
in memory: the mental representation of the concept bird is a set containing the rep-
resentation of (some of) the birds we encountered during our past experience. Another
well known typicality-based theory of concepts is the so called the theory-theory [27].
Such approach adopts some form of holistic point of view about concepts. According
to some versions of the theory-theories, concepts are analogous to theoretical terms in
a scientific theory. For example, the concept cat is individuated by the role it plays in
our mental theory of zoology. In other versions of the approach, concepts themselves
are identified with micro-theories of some sort. For example, the concept cat should be
identified with a mentally represented microtheory about cats.
Although these approaches have been largely considered as competing ones (since
they propose different models and predictions about how we organize and reason on
conceptual information), they turned out to be not mutually exclusive [24]. Rather, they
seem to succeed in explaining different classes of cognitive phenomena, such as the
fact that human subjects use different representations to categorize concepts. In partic-
ular, it seems that we can use - in different situations - exemplars, prototypes or theo-
ries [30, 27, 14]. Such experimental evidences led to the development of the so called
“heterogeneous hypothesis” about the nature of concepts: this approach assumes that
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concepts do not constitute a unitary phenomenon, and hypothesizes that different types
of conceptual representations may co-exist: prototypes, exemplars, theory-like or clas-
sical representations [23]. All such representations, in this view, constitute different
bodies of knowledge and contain different types of information associated to the the
same conceptual entity. Furthermore, each body of conceptual knowledge is assumed
to be featured by specific processes in which such representations are involved (e.g., in
cognitive tasks like recognition, learning, categorization, etc.). In particular prototypes,
exemplars and theory-like default representations are associated with the possibility of
dealing with non-monotonic strategies of reasoning and categorization, while the clas-
sical representations (i.e. that ones based on necessary and/or sufficient conditions) are
associated with standard deductive mechanism of reasoning 2.
In recent years an alternative theory of concepts has been proposed: the proxytype
theory. It postulates a biological localization and interaction between different brain ar-
eas for dealing with conceptual structures. Such localization have a direct counterpart
in the well known distinction between long term and working memory [28]. In addi-
tion, such characterization is particularly interesting for the explanation of phenomena
such as, for example, the activation (and the retrieval) of conceptual information. In this
setting, concepts are seen as proxytypes. A proxytype is any element of a complex repre-
sentational network stored in long-term memory corresponding to a particular category
that can be tokenized in working memory to ‘go proxy’ for that category [28]. In other
terms, the proxytype theory, inspired by the work of Barsalou [3], considers concepts as
temporary constructs of a given category, activated (tokenized) in working memory as
a result of conceptual processing activities, such as concept identification, recognition
and retrieval.
2 In order to explain the different categorization strategies associated to different kinds of repre-
sentations, let us consider the following examples: if we have to categorize a stimulus with the
following features: “it has fur, woofs and wags its tail”, the result of a prototype-based catego-
rization would be dog, since these cues are associated to the prototype of dog. Prototype-based
reasoning, however, is not the only type of reasoning based on typicality. In fact, if an exem-
plar corresponding to the stimulus being categorized is available, too, it is acknowledged that
humans use to classify it by evaluating its similarity w.r.t. the exemplar, rather than w.r.t. the
prototype associated to the underlying concepts [10]. For example, a penguin is rather dissim-
ilar from the prototype of bird. However, if we already know an exemplar of penguin, and if
we know that it is an instance of bird, it is easier to classify a new penguin as a bird w.r.t. a
categorization process based on the similarity with the prototype of that category. This type of
common-sense categorization is known in literature as exemplars-based categorization. An ex-
ample of theory-like common sense reasoning is when we typically associate to a light switch
the learned rule that if we turn it “on” then the light will be provided (this is a non-monotonic
inference with a defeasible conclusion). Finally, the classical representations (i.e. those based
on necessary and/or sufficient conditions) are associated with standard deductive mechanism
of reasoning. An example of standard deductive reasoning is the categorization as triangle of a
stimulus described by the features: “it is a polygon, it has three corners and three sides”. Such
cues, in fact, are necessary and sufficient for the definition of the concept of triangle. All these
representations, and the corresponding reasoning mechanisms, are assumed to be potentially
co-existing according to the heterogeneity approach.
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3 Heterogeneous Proxytypes
In the original formulation of the proxytypes theory, however, proxytypes have been
depicted as monolithic conceptual structures, primarily intended as prototypes [8]. A
revised view of this approach has been recently proposed, hypothesizing the availability
of a wider range of representation types than just prototypes [17]. They correspond
to the kinds of representations hypothesized by the above mentioned heterogeneous
approach to concepts. In this sense, proxytypes are assumed to be heterogeneous in
nature (i.e., they are assumed to be composed by heterogeneous networks of conceptual
representations and not only by a monolithic one)3.
In this renewed formulation, heterogeneous representations (such as prototypes, ex-
emplars, theory-like structures, etc.) for each conceptual category are assumed to be
stored in long-term memory. They can be activated and accessed by resorting to differ-
ent categorization strategies. In this view, each representation has its associated access-
ing procedures. In the following, I will briefly present how such theoretical hypothesis
has been implemented in the DUAL-PECCS categorization system, and I will use the
latter system as a computational referent for showing how the proposals presented in
this paper can extend both the system itself and, more importantly, its underlying theo-
retical framework.
3.1 Heterogeneous Proxytypes in DUAL-PECCS
DUAL-PECCS [20, 21], is a cognitive categorization system explicitly designed and
implemented under the heterogeneous proxytypes assumption4 for both the representa-
tional level (that is: it is equipped with a hybrid knowledge base composed of heteroge-
neous representations, each endowed with specific reasoning mechanisms) and for the
‘proxyfication’ mechanisms (i.e.: the set of procedures implementing the tokenization
of the different representations in working memory). The heterogeneous conceptual
architecture of DUAL PECCS includes prototypes, exemplars and classical represen-
tations. All these different bodies of knowledge point to the same conceptual entity
(the anchoring for these different types of representations is obtained via the Wordnet,
see again [21]). An example of the heterogeneous conceptual architecture of DUAL
PECCS is provided in the Figure 1. Such figure shows how it is represented the concept
dog. In this case, the prototypical representation grasps information such as that dogs
are usually conceptualized as domestic animals, with typically four legs, a tail etc.; the
exemplar-based representations grasp information on individuals. For example, in Fig. 1
3 The heterogeneity assumption has been recently pointed out as one of the problems to face in
order to address the problems affecting the knowledge level in cognitive systems and architec-
ture [19, 5].
4 The characterization in terms of “heterogeneous proxytypes”, among the other things, enables
the system to deal with the problem of the “contextual activation” of a given information based
on the external stimulus being considered. In particular (by following the idea that, when we
categorize a stimulus, we do not activate the whole network of knowledge related to its as-
signed category but, conversely, we only activate the knowledge that is “contextually relevant”
in its respect), DUAL-PECCS proxyfyes only the type of representation that minimizes the
distance w.r.t. the percept (see [17] for further details).
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Fig. 1: Heterogeneous representational architecture for the concept DOG in DUAL-PECCS.
it is represented the individual of Lessie, which is a particular exemplar of dog with
white and brown fur and with a less domestic attitude w.r.t. the prototypical dog (e.g.
its typical location is lawn). Within the system, both the exemplar and prototype-based
representations make use of non classical (or typical) information and are represented
by using the framework of the conceptual spaces [12, 18]: a particular type of vector
space model adopting standard similarity metrics to determine the distance between in-
stances and concepts within the space. The representation of classical information (e.g.
the fact that Dog v Animal, that is to say that “Dogs are also Animals”) is, on the
other hand, demanded to standard ontological formalisms. In the current version of the
system the classical knowledge component is grounded in the OpenCyc ontology [16].
By assuming the heterogeneous hypothesis, in DUAL-PECCS, different kinds of
reasoning strategies are associated to these different bodies of knowledge. In particular,
the system combines non-monotonic common-sense reasoning (associated to the pro-
totypical and exemplars-based, conceptual spaces, representations) and standard mono-
tonic categorization procedures (associated to the classical, ontological, body of knowl-
edge). These different types of reasoning are harmonized according to the theoretical
tenets coming from the dual process theories of reasoning and rationality [9, 13].
As emerges from the figure 1, a missing part of the current conceptual architecture
in the DUAL-PECCS system (and in its underlying theoretical hypothesis) concerns the
representation of the default knowledge in terms of theory-like representational struc-
tures (while it already integrates classical, prototypical and exemplars based knowl-
edge reprentation and processing mechanisms). In the next section we will show how
Theory-like representations can be considered dual in nature (at least from a formal
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point of view) and therefore may deserve a dual treatment also form a computational
point of view.
4 The Duality of Theory-Like Representations
As mentioned in Section 2, Theory-theory approaches [26, 27] assume that concepts
consists of more or less complex mental structures representing (among other things)
causal and explanatory relations between them (including folk psychology connec-
tions). During the 80’s, these approaches stemmed from a critique to the formerly dom-
inant theory of concepts as prototypes. Consider, for example, the famous [14] trans-
formation experiments, in which subjects were asked to make categorization judgments
about the biological membership of an animal that had undergone unusual transforma-
tions. In such experiment, Keil showed that people relies on theory-like representation
(instead of prototypes) in order to execute their categorization task. In particular, it was
shown that the type of knowledge retrieved by the subjects to solve these tasks belongs
to their “default common-sense theory” associated to a given concept.
The idea that for most of our categories, our default knowledge includes a common-
sense theory of that category (and that theory-like default bodies of knowledge are as-
sociated with a distinct kind of categorization process) is, however, only one of the
available interpretations about the theory-like representational structures [23]. Another
kind of interpretation, in fact, assumes that theory-like structures do not constitute our
typical default knowledge but that, on the other hand, they are constitutive of our clas-
sical background knowledge [4]. In order to better explain this difference, and thus the
duality of the theory-like representations, let us consider the case of DUAL-PECCS.
As mentioned above, the current version of the system does not allow to represent the
type of theory-like default knowledge belonging to the typical conceptual component
of the architecture (see footnote 1 for an example of the non-monotonic reasoning that
could be enabled by this kind of knowledge). On the other hand, it allows to represent
(in terms of IF-THEN rules enabling monotonic inferences), the kind of theory-like
knowledge structures which are compliant with the ontological semantics of the clas-
sical conceptual component. In other words: only certain types of theories, i.e. causal
theories, belonging to the background knowledge of a cognitive agents, are currently
covered by the integration of the current state of the art ontology languages and rules
[11] in the DUAL-PECCS system. However, as already pointed out before, common
sense knowledge is mostly characterized in terms of “theories” which are based on
arbitrary, i.e. experience-based, rules. Therefore, in order to represent, within an ar-
tificial system, more realistic (from a cognitive standpoint) “theories”, i.e. including
common-sense default theories as intended in the theory-theory approaches, there is the
need of going beyond classical logic rules. Recently, graphical models (in particular
Bayesian networks) have been proposed as a computational framework able to rep-
resent [7, 6] knowledge networks of theory-like common-sense default representation.
The integration of such framework within the DUAL-PECCS system represent a cur-
rent and future area of development, not yet concluded. In the remaining of this paper,
such integration will not be discussed and, in a certain sense, will be taken for granted.
I shall focus, instead, on the presentation of a novel unifying categorization algorithm
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- named DELTA - able to harmonize all the different types of typicality-based repre-
sentations and reasoning mechanisms associated with the common-sense knowledge:
exemplars, prototypes and default theory-like representations. I will leave aside the dis-
cussion concerning the integration of such common-sense categorization mechanisms
with those concerning the classical monotonic ones. As above mentioned, in fact, such
integration is already provided in DUAL-PECCS [21, 20] and is tackled by recurring to
the dual process theory of reasoning (i.e.: the non monotonic reasoning results of the
heterogeneous common-sense conceptual components are then checked and integrated
with the monotonic reasoning strategies executed in the classical conceptual compo-
nent). Therefore, the underlying heterogeneous-proxytypes assumption, integrated with
the dual process theory of reasoning, has been already proven to be effective to har-
monize non monotonic and monotonic categorization strategies associated to hetero-
geneous body of knowledge. I will not report here the details of such harmonization
procedure because it is already documented elsewhere [21]. I will focus, instead, on the
harmonization procedures concerning the non monotonic categorization processes of
the typical conceptual components.
5 A Unified Categorization Algorithm for Exemplars, Prototypes
and Theory-Like Representations
In the following, I propose a novel categorization algorithm that, given a certain stim-
ulus d, must select the most appropriate typicality-based representation available in the
declarative memory of a cognitive agent (i.e. a prototype, an exemplar or a theory-
like structure). According to what introduced in the previous sections, such declarative
memory is assumed to rely on the heterogeneous proxytypes hypothesis.
The implemented procedure works as follows: when the input stimulus is similar
enough to an exemplar representation (a threshold has been fixed to these ends and is
already in use in DUAL-PECCS), the corresponding exemplar of a given category is
retrieved. Otherwise, the prototypical representations are also scanned and the repre-
sentation (prototype or exemplar) that is closest to the input is returned. By following
a preference that has been experimentally observed in human cognition [25], this al-
gorithm favors the results of the exemplars-based categorization if the knowledge-base
stores any exemplars similar to the input being categorized. As an additional constraint,
it has been hypothesized a mechanism in which theory-like structures of default knowl-
edge can also override the categorization based on prototypes. Such mechanism has
been devised based on the fact that theory-theorists have shown that, in some categor-
ical judgments tasks (e.g. assessing the situation where a dog is made to look like a
raccoon), categorization is driven by the possession of a rudimentary biological the-
ory and by theory-like representations [2]. In other words: being a dog, for example,
isn’t just a matter of looking like a dog. It seems, in fact, that it is more important to
have a network of appropriate hidden properties of dogs: the dog “essence” [2]. In the
proposed algorithm, this element has been taken into account by hypothesizing: i) to
measure the similarity between the theory-like representation of the first retrieved pro-
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totype with the stimulus d 5 and ii) to compare the obtained result with a Conceptual
Coherence Threshold that should measure how much the considered stimulus d shares,
i.e. is conceptually coherent, with the corresponding theory-like representation of the
retrieved prototype. The analysis of the conceptual coherence can be solved as a con-
straint satisfaction problem as shown in [33].
In this setting, if the distance between the stimulus d and theory-like representation
of the originally retrieved prototype is above the considered threshold, it means that
the retrieved prototype is assumed to be representative enough of the common-sense
“essence’ of d (i.e it is “coherent enough’). In this case, the prototypical answer is
maintained, otherwise it is overridden by the theory-like representation which is closer
to d.
Let us assume, for example, that the stimulus to categorize is represented by an
atypical Golden Zebra (which is almost totally white) and that in our agent’s long-
term memory there is no exemplar similar enough to this entity. This means that there
will be no exemplar-based representation selected by our algorithm, and that the most
similar representation to d will be searched among the prototypical representations in
the agent knowledge base. Now: if we assume that the retrieved prototype is a typi-
cal white horse, we could discard such representation by simply relying on additional
information coming from the stimulus d (e.g. the fact that lives in the Savannah, etc.)
and comparing d with the default and common-sense theory associated to a horse (i.e.
the category associated to the original prototypical choice). In this case, the categorical
selection of the class Golden Zebra would be obtained by exploiting theory-like repre-
sentational networks. A synthetic representation of the proposed procedure is presented
in the Algorithm 1.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper I have proposed a categorization algorithm able to unify all the common-
sense categorization strategies proposed in the cognitive science literature: exemplars,
prototypes and theory-like common-sense knowledge structures. To the best of my
knowledge, this proposal represents the first attempt of providing a unifying catego-
rization strategy by assuming a heterogeneous representational hypothesis. In partic-
ular, the proposed algorithm relies and extends both the representational and the rea-
soning framework considering concepts as heterogeneous proxytypes [17]. The current
theoretical proposal needs to be tested on the empirical ground in order to show both
its feasibility with psychological data and its efficacy in the area of artificial cognitive
systems. Also, there are additional elements, only sketched in this paper, requiring a
more precise characterization. For example: the design of a method to calculate which
is the most appropriate theory-like representations to select (line 13, Algorithm 1). On
this point, however, it is worth-noticing that, since the most promising computational
candidates for representing the theory-like body of knowledge are graphical models
and probabilistic semantic networks, it seems plausible to imagine that such calculation
5 Since all the different bodies of knowledge are assumed to be co-referring representational
structure pointing to the same conceptual entity, it is possible to recover the theory-like repre-
sentation associated, for example, to a given prototype or exemplar based representation.
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could be performed with standard heuristics search on graph structures. Similarly, the
individuation and the construction of a plausible Conceptual Coherence Threshold rep-
resents an issue that should be faced and solved empirically.
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